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INTENT: PROVING INTENT THROUGH
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ABSTRACT
Politicians are increasingly employing dog whistles in campaign
speech to appeal to a divided electorate. Simultaneously, states continue
to pass legislation restricting minority access to the ballot box. Litigants
attempting to challenge new vote denial laws are left with only one
tool—Section 3 of the Voting Rights Act—which requires the difficult
task of demonstrating that the jurisdiction violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. Despite the frequency of dog whistles, courts have
declined to use campaign rhetoric as evidence of discriminatory intent
in Fourteenth Amendment challenges.
This Note argues that, to ease the nearly insurmountable burden of
proving discriminatory intent in voting rights challenges, courts should
consider dog whistles in campaign speech as evidence of discriminatory
intent. It is particularly important for voters to prove discriminatory
intent in voting rights cases because they face the unique difficulty of
distinguishing between closely aligned racial-discrimination
motivations and political-party motivations; Section 3 of the VRA
allows for preclearance systems once discriminatory intent is proven;
and broader, less tailored remedies become available when litigants can
successfully prove intent.
The right to vote is a right “preservative of [all] other basic civil and
political rights.” Considering dog whistles as evidence of
discriminatory intent gives litigants a necessary tool to protect this
fundamental right.
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Dog Whistle (noun)
[A] remark, speech, advertisement, etc. by a politician that is intended
to be understood by a particular group, especially one with feelings of
racism or hatred, without actually expressing these feelings.1

INTRODUCTION
The day before Georgia’s 2018 gubernatorial election, Georgia’s
Secretary of State, Brian Kemp, tweeted: “The Black Panther Party is
backing my opponent. RT if you think Abrams is TOO EXTREME
for Georgia!”2 In one of his campaign ads, titled “So Conservative,” he
proclaimed, “I got a big truck, just in case I need to round up criminal
illegals and take ‘em home myself. Yep, I just said that.”3 In the bitter
race between Kemp and former State Representative Stacey Abrams,4
Kemp’s skillful use of dog whistles—remarks of racism and hatred
intended to be understood by a particular group—in his tweets and
campaign ads resonated with Georgia voters.5
The divisiveness of Georgia’s gubernatorial election was
intensified by the state’s controversial voter-registration law. Enacted
in 2017, Georgia’s “exact match” law6 required that information
entered into a voter-registration form exactly match the applicant’s
Drivers Services or Social Security records.7 Despite being a candidate
in the race, Kemp was in charge of the implementation of the voter-

1. Dog Whistle, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/
english/dog-whistle [https://perma.cc/U8JE-DXWT].
2. Brian Kemp (@BrianKempGA), TWITTER (Nov. 5, 2018, 3:00 PM), https://twitter.com/
BrianKempGA/status/1059581337554898944 [https://perma.cc/8JZ4-ALZT].
9,
2018),
3. Kemp
for
Governor,
So
Conservative,
YOUTUBE (May
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Q1cfjh6VfE [https://perma.cc/PD6R-7HNL].
4. Georgia Governor Election Results, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2019, 10:33 AM),
https://www.nytimes.com/elections/results/georgia-governor [https://perma.cc/XX7A-VKGM]
(discussing the Georgia gubernatorial election results and noting that the Kemp–Abrams race
was “among the country’s most expensive and vitriolic”).
5. April Glaser, It Was Too Easy for Brian Kemp’s Last-Minute Dog Whistle About Stacey
Abrams To Go Viral, SLATE (Nov. 6, 2018, 11:46 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2018/11/briankemp-stacey-abrams-dog-whistle-black-panthers-facebook.html [https://perma.cc/QFY3-SEFG];
see also Georgia Governor Election Results, supra note 4 (detailing the 2018 Georgia
gubernatorial election results, in which Kemp won by a narrow margin).
6. H.B. 268, 154th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2017) (codified in scattered sections of
Title 21 of the Georgia Code).
7. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 2, Ga. Coal. for the Peoples’ Agenda,
Inc. v. Kemp, 347 F. Supp. 3d 1251 (N.D. Ga. 2018) (No. 1:18-CV-04727-ELR) [hereinafter
Complaint].
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registration requirements during the state’s 2018 elections,8
vehemently defending the law.9 When applied, the law produced “a
high rate of erroneous ‘no-matches’ that disproportionately impact[ed]
African-American, Latino and Asian-American applicants.”10 For
instance, the removal or addition of letters, hyphens, spaces, or
apostrophes could lead to a no-match, and “minority voters are more
likely statistically to have names with hyphens or suffixes or other
punctuation that can make it more difficult to match their name in
databases.”11 The law’s effects were glaring during the election, as the
law purged more than 53,000 voters—who were predominantly
black—and moved them to pending status.12 Abrams and voting rights
advocacy groups alleged that Kemp used his authority as Secretary of
State to suppress votes and swing the election in his favor.13 The suit
alleged violations of both the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) and the
Fourteenth Amendment.14 However, the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia hardly discussed the VRA’s
discriminatory-intent requirement, dismissed Fourteenth Amendment
claims, and did not mention Kemp’s tweets or campaign ads.15
In an age of divisive politics, dog whistles in campaign rhetoric are
pervasive. As voters increasingly affiliate themselves politically

8. Ben Nadler, Voting Rights Become a Flashpoint in Georgia Governor’s Race,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 9, 2018), https://apnews.com/fb011f39af3b40518b572c8cce6e906c
[https://perma.cc/2DAP-JQYG].
9. Kemp’s office defended the law by claiming that it
“applies equally across all demographics,” but these numbers became skewed by “the
higher usage of one method of registration among one particular demographic group.”
....
Kemp dismissed and derided the legal threat targeting the “exact match” policy,
issuing a statement saying that with Election Day coming up, “it’s high time for another
frivolous lawsuit from liberal activist groups.”
Id.
10. Complaint, supra note 7, at 5.
11. Miriam Valverde, Georgia’s ‘Exact Match’ Law and the Abrams-Kemp Governor’s
Election, Explained, POLITIFACT (Oct. 19, 2018, 1:37 PM), https://www.politifact.com/georgia/
article/2018/oct/19/georgias-exact-match-law-and-its-impact-voters-gov [https://perma.cc/9APEJ2B5].
12. Nadler, supra note 8. “Voters whose applications are frozen in ‘pending’ status have 26
months to fix any issues before their application is canceled, and can still cast a provisional ballot.”
Id. Applicants frozen in pending status can still vote if they provide proper photo identification
at their polling place. Valverde, supra note 11.
13. Nadler, supra note 8.
14. See, e.g., Ga. Coal. for the People’s Agenda, Inc. v. Kemp, 347 F. Supp. 3d 1251, 1255
(N.D. Ga. 2018) (referencing alleged violations of the VRA and the Fourteenth Amendment).
15. See generally id.
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through their identities, politicians are more frequently appealing to
these identity-based divisions.16 For instance, Ron DeSantis, candidate
for Florida’s 2018 gubernatorial election, warned that “voters should
not ‘monkey this up’ by electing his opponent, Andrew Gillum,” who
would have been the state’s first black governor.17 DeSantis defeated
Gillum by a narrow margin to become governor.18 Soon after taking
office, DeSantis signed a bill requiring felons to pay “outstanding fines,
fees or restitution” to restore their voting rights,19 a bill that has been
equated to a modern-day poll tax.20 From terms and phrases like
“urban” and “inner city” to “radical Islam” and “illegal immigrant,”21
dog whistles have been used to win elections22 and appeal to a large
body of voters with racial resentments and animosities.23
This Note examines how dog whistles can serve as evidence of
discriminatory intent in voting rights challenges. In 1965, Congress
passed the VRA to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments

16. Eugene Scott, 2018: The Year of Dog Whistle Politics, WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/11/14/year-dog-whistle-politics [https://perma.cc/
NQ73-Y3JQ].
17. Julia Jacobs, DeSantis Warns Florida Not To ‘Monkey This Up,’ and Many Hear a Racist
Dog Whistle, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/29/us/politics/
desantis-monkey-up-gillum.html [https://perma.cc/9FLG-B5FS].
18. Marc Caputo, DeSantis Wins Florida Gubernatorial Race as Gillum Concedes, POLITICO
(Nov. 17, 2018, 5:36 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/11/17/desantis-wins-floridagubernatorial-race-as-gillum-concedes-1000530 [https://perma.cc/4PMA-L5H5].
19. Arian Campo-Flores, Florida Gov. DeSantis Signs a Bill That Adds Restrictions to Felon
Voting, WALL ST. J. (June 28, 2019, 8:51 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/florida-gov-desantissigns-felon-voting-bill-11561762090 [https://perma.cc/ZVE2-696U]. In the 2018 election, Florida
voters passed a constitutional amendment to restore felons’ voting rights. Id. DeSantis’s bill
“exclude[s] tens of thousands of people who should qualify to regain [their right to] vote.” Id. A
group of civil rights organizations, on behalf of ten Floridians, filed a lawsuit to challenge the bill.
Doha Madani, Civil Rights Groups Sue Florida over ‘Poll Tax’ Law To Restore Felon Voter Rights,
NBC NEWS (June 28, 2019, 9:52 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/civil-rightsgroup-sue-florida-over-poll-tax-law-restore-n1024866 [https://perma.cc/FFP9-X9YS].
20. Campo-Flores, supra note 19.
21. German Lopez, The Sneaky Language Today’s Politicians Use To Get Away with Racism
and Sexism, VOX (Feb. 1, 2016, 4:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/2016/2/1/10889138/codedlanguage-thug-bossy [https://perma.cc/Z7HJ-2ETU].
22. Sara Grossman, Blog: Revisiting ‘Dog Whistle Politics,’ HAAS INST. (Sept. 22, 2017),
https://haasinstitute.berkeley.edu/blog-revisiting-dog-whistle-politics [https://perma.cc/G6FP85HA].
23. See, e.g., Sean McElwee & Jason McDaniel, Economic Anxiety Didn’t Make People Vote
Trump, Racism Did, NATION (May 8, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/economicanxiety-didnt-make-people-vote-trump-racism-did [https://perma.cc/2GN6-KFN9] (“[R]acial
attitudes towards blacks and immigration [were] the key factors associated with support for
Trump.”).
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and achieve equality at the ballot box.24 In particular, Congress sought
to address vote denial schemes, or “direct, formal discriminatory
practices intended to exclude black participation in the central political
and economic institutions of American life.”25 After its enactment,
Section 2 became the focus of voting rights litigation,26 particularly to
address states engaged in vote dilution, or “practices that diminish
minorities’ political influence in places where they are allowed to
vote.”27 However, recent disputes over voting rights have again shifted
to issues of vote denial and barriers to registration.28 In response to this
changed landscape, litigants have increasingly added Fourteenth
Amendment claims to their voting rights challenges.29 To block or
mitigate the effects of vote denial laws, plaintiffs utilized the VRA’s
preclearance protections in Section 5,30 which required “covered”
states and localities with histories of intentional discrimination to
obtain federal approval before making any changes to their voting
laws.31 However, in Shelby County v. Holder,32 the Court struck down
Section 4(b),33 rendering Section 5 inoperative.34
To continue obtaining federal protections under the VRA,
litigants turned to Section 3(c),35 a “seldom-used path to federal
preclearance.”36 Section 3(c) allows courts to mandate preclearance

24. Edward K. Olds, Note, More Than “Rarely Used”: A Post-Shelby Judicial Standard for
Section 3 Preclearance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2185, 2190 (2017).
25. Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation of
Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1838 (1992) [hereinafter Issacharoff,
Polarized Voting].
26. Id.; see also Dale E. Ho, Voting Rights Litigation After Shelby County: Mechanics and
Standards in Section 2 Vote Denial Claims, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 675, 678–79 (2014)
[hereinafter Ho, Voting Rights Litigation After Shelby County].
27. Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights
Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 691 (2006) [hereinafter Tokaji, The New Vote Denial].
28. Ho, Voting Rights Litigation After Shelby County, supra note 26, at 679.
29. Danielle Lang & J. Gerald Hebert, A Post-Shelby Strategy: Exposing Discriminatory
Intent in Voting Rights Litigation, 127 YALE L.J. F. 779, 783–84 (2018).
30. Id.
31. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified as amended
at 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (2018)); Ho, Voting Rights Litigation After Shelby County, supra note 26, at
675–76.
32. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
33. Id. at 557 (declaring Section 4(b) unconstitutional). Section 4(b) established a coverage
formula to determine which covered states and localities were required to obtain preclearance.
Voting Rights Act § 4(b) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10303(b)).
34. Ho, Voting Rights Litigation After Shelby County, supra note 26, at 676.
35. Voting Rights Act § 3(c) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10302(c)).
36. Olds, supra note 24, at 2186.
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regimes after finding that a jurisdiction violated the Fourteenth
Amendment, allowing for a more targeted and flexible preclearance
requirement than the one in Section 5.37 This inquiry requires proving
that the procedure has both discriminatory effects and was enacted
with discriminatory intent.38 Yet, despite the increasing prevalence of
dog whistles in campaign speech39 and the recent wave of restrictive
voting laws,40 plaintiffs have faced challenges proving discriminatory
intent in Fourteenth Amendment challenges.41 Although courts
generally decline to use campaign rhetoric as evidence of
discriminatory intent in Fourteenth Amendment challenges,42 the
Supreme Court has attempted to ease the difficulty of “[d]etermining
whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor.”43
Given the prevalence of dog whistles in campaign rhetoric, the time is
ripe to discuss their use by the courts.
This Note argues that, to ease the nearly insurmountable burden
of proving discriminatory intent in voting rights challenges, courts
should consider dog whistles in campaign speech as evidence of
invidious intent. The importance of easing the burdens of proving
discriminatory intent in voting rights cases in particular is threefold.
First, litigants face the unique difficulty of distinguishing between

37. Id.
38. Paul M. Wiley, Note, Shelby and Section 3: Pulling the Voting Rights Act’s Pocket Trigger
To Protect Voting Rights After Shelby County v. Holder, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2115, 2129–30
(2014).
39. Eugene Scott, 2018: The Year of Dog Whistle Politics, WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/11/14/year-dog-whistle-politics [https://perma.cc/
CFC3-H39D].
40. Election 2016: Restrictive Voting Laws by the Numbers, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE
(Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/election-2016-restrictive-voting-lawsnumbers [https://perma.cc/X2NN-Q675] [hereinafter BRENNAN CTR., Election 2016].
41. See Rachel D. Godsil, Expressivism, Empathy and Equality, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
247, 270 n.106 (2003) (“[T]he discriminatory intent requirement of the Court’s Equal Protection
doctrine is likely to defeat most Equal Protection challenges where plaintiffs cannot produce a
smoking gun of intentional discrimination.”).
42. See, e.g., Jessica A. Clarke, Explicit Bias, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 510–13 (2018)
(discussing concerns raised by courts in using “explicit bias,” including unofficial statements, as
evidence of discrimination); Shawn E. Fields, Is It Bad Law To Believe a Politician? Campaign
Speech and Discriminatory Intent, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 273, 294 (2018) (“[C]ourts remain reluctant
to . . . consider evidence of discriminatory intent beyond the four corners of an official
governmental record, even though no doctrinal restriction prevents them from doing so.”).
43. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)
(establishing a six-factor test to prove discriminatory intent “even when the governing legislation
appears neutral on its face” by conducting “a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct
evidence of intent as may be available”).
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racial-discrimination motivations and political-party motivations,
which are closely aligned. Thus, legislators can easily reframe a racially
discriminatory law as one motivated by partisan reasons, avoiding
Equal Protection problems and receiving deference. Second, Section 3
of the VRA allows for preclearance systems once discriminatory intent
is proven. And third, broader, less tailored remedies become available
when litigants can successfully prove intent.
Part I of this Note provides background on the VRA and traces
the evolution of voting rights litigation under the VRA. Part II
discusses the history of discriminatory-intent analysis under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Part III examines three reasons why proving
discriminatory intent is particularly important for plaintiffs engaged in
voting rights litigation. Part IV presents the arguments made for
overlooking evidence of discrimination in campaign speech and
ultimately concludes that courts should consider dog whistles as
evidence of discriminatory intent in voting rights challenges. Doing so
would allow litigants to overcome some of the challenges of proving
discriminatory intent and ultimately protect the right to vote, a right
“preservative of [all] other basic civil and political rights.”44
I. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
This Part reviews Sections 2, 5, 4, and 3 of the VRA, which are the
major substantive provisions that litigators utilize to protect against
discriminatory voting mechanisms. It ultimately concludes that Section
3 of the VRA is the only remaining—and most powerful—tool for
plaintiffs to challenge new vote denial laws; Section 2 is effective but
was largely developed for vote dilution schemes; and Sections 5 and
4(b) have been rendered inoperative by Shelby.
This Part is split into four sections: Section (A) surveys the
enactment of the VRA; Section (B) discusses Section 2 and its
ineffectiveness for new vote denial laws; Section (C) details Shelby and
the inoperability of Sections 5 and 4(b); and Section (D) considers how
Section 3 can be a helpful tool for litigants seeking to challenge new
vote denial legislation.

44. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
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A. The VRA’s Enactment
At the height of the Civil Rights Movement, activists marched for
voting rights in Selma, Alabama.45 They hoped to gain protections from
the increasing vote denial laws enacted by southern states that
circumvented the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.46 Many of
these states had implemented literacy tests, poll taxes, and property
qualifications,47 and by the beginning of the twentieth century,
“virtually all African Americans in the South were denied the right to
vote.”48 The activists’ fifty-mile march ended a few blocks later,
however, as Alabama state troopers beat them “with billy clubs in a
cloud of tear gas.”49
The violence spurred action on comprehensive voting rights
legislation, and five months later, on August 6, 1965, President Johnson
signed the VRA into law.50 Congress originally fashioned the VRA as
a tool to address the vote denial schemes that were prevalent in the
South51 and to “achiev[e] equality at the ballot box.”52 It was
immediately successful in dismantling direct impediments to
participation.53 In the first two years of the VRA’s passage, African
American voter registration increased from 29.3 percent to 52.1
percent in the seven covered states.54 By the end of 1967, over half a
million new African American voters were registered.55 The rise in
African American enfranchisement made it more difficult for illintentioned politicians to prevent African Americans from voting
altogether. Eventually, these politicians searched for new ways to

45. Today in History - March 7: First March from Selma, LIBR. CONG.,
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/today/mar07.html [https://perma.cc/QP6N-Q8JQ].
46. Daniel P. Tokaji, If It’s Broke, Fix It: Improving Voting Rights Act Preclearance, 49 HOW.
L.J. 785, 790–91 (2006) [hereinafter Tokaji, If It’s Broke, Fix It].
47. Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own Success?,
104 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1711 (2004) [hereinafter Issacharoff, Victim of Its Own Success].
48. Tokaji, If It’s Broke, Fix It, supra note 46, at 790.
49. The Selma to Montgomery Voting Rights March: Shaking the Conscience of the Nation,
U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR: NAT’L PARK SERV., http://www.nps.gov/nr/twhp/wwwlps/lessons/
133semo/133selma.htm [https://perma.cc/AJX4-UUAQ].
50. Id.
51. Issacharoff, Polarized Voting, supra note 25, at 1838.
52. Olds, supra note 24, at 2190.
53. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial, supra note 27, at 701–03.
54. BERNARD GROFMAN, LISA HANDLEY & RICHARD G. NIEMI, MINORITY
REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY 23 (1992).
55. Id. at 21.
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weaken African American influence at the ballot box.56 Thus, the
techniques of discrimination swiftly shifted from vote denial to vote
dilution schemes, which “canceled out or minimized . . . voting
strength.”57 Congress subsequently amended the VRA with vote
dilution in mind, leading VRA litigation to largely focus on dilutive
techniques.58
In recent years, barriers to voting rights have again shifted to laws
restricting voter registration and access to the ballot.59 Though the
current trend of vote denial is not as blatantly discriminatory as before,
felon disenfranchisement, voting machines, and voter ID laws continue
to restrict minority access to the ballot box.60 Before the 2012 election,
nineteen states passed laws obstructing individuals’ rights to vote or
register to vote, such as voter-ID laws and early voting cutbacks.61
Leading up to the 2016 election, seventeen states passed new restrictive
voting laws.62 The “new vote denial” schemes are “a throwback to the
early days of voting rights enforcement” and “involve practices that
disproportionately exclude minority voters from” access to the ballot
box altogether.63 However, discriminatory intent in new vote denial
schemes, unlike in early vote denial practices, is less overt.64 Because
“government actors nowadays are less likely to admit that intentional
discrimination underlies their actions,” it has become increasingly
difficult to prove discriminatory intent.65
The VRA was designed as “a broad, remedial tool to prevent all
forms of racial discrimination in voting”;66 it therefore has several
mechanisms to combat voting discrimination. As techniques of
discrimination shift, different sections of the VRA are more effective
for challengers.

56. Dale Ho, Minority Vote Dilution in the Age of Obama, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1041, 1054–
55 (2013) [hereinafter Ho, Minority Vote Dilution].
57. Dale E. Ho, Building an Umbrella in a Rainstorm: The New Vote Denial Litigation Since
Shelby County, 127 YALE L.J. FORUM 799, 800 (2018) [hereinafter Ho, Building an Umbrella in
a Rainstorm].
58. Id. at 801.
59. Ho, Voting Rights Litigation After Shelby County, supra note 26, at 679.
60. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial, supra note 27, at 691–92.
61. Ho, Building an Umbrella in a Rainstorm, supra note 57, at 799–800.
62. BRENNAN CTR., Election 2016, supra note 40.
63. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial, supra note 27, at 718–19.
64. Id. at 719.
65. Id.
66. Ho, Minority Vote Dilution, supra note 56, at 1056.
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B. Section 2
To address the shift in voting discrimination methods from vote
denial to vote dilution, Congress amended the VRA in 1982 to prohibit
“any State or political subdivision” from restricting voting “in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.”67
Congress’s focus on vote dilution claims and creation of a results test
was in direct response68 to the decision in City of Mobile v. Bolden.69 In
Bolden, a plurality of the Court concluded that intentional
discrimination was necessary for a vote dilution scheme to violate the
Constitution.70 Requiring discriminatory intent made it difficult for
voters to challenge widespread vote dilution schemes.71 Accordingly,
the amendments revised Section 2 to instead incorporate a results test,
allowing litigants to demonstrate that a policy has a disproportionate
racial impact through a “totality of [the] circumstances.”72
Shortly after the 1982 amendments, the Court established a
specific framework for claims under Section 2 in Thornburg v.
Gingles.73 The Court articulated three “necessary preconditions” that
a litigant must satisfy in a Section 2 vote dilution claim.74 First, the
minority group must demonstrate that it is “sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member
district.”75 Second, the group must “show that it is politically
cohesive.”76 Third, the group must demonstrate that “the white

67. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, sec. 3, § 2, 96 Stat. 131, 134
(codified at 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2018)) (emphasis added).
68. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial, supra note 27, at 704.
69. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
70. See id. at 65 (holding that the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits only purposeful
discrimination).
71. See Tokaji, The New Vote Denial, supra note 27, at 704 (noting that requiring direct
evidence of discriminatory intent “made it significantly more difficult for minority voters to
challenge election systems that effectively prevent them from electing candidates of their
choice”).
72. Voting Rights Act Amendments sec. 3 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b)).
The accompanying Senate report to the 1982 amendments listed seven factors that could be used
to demonstrate that a voting restriction denied minority voters “an equal opportunity to
participate in the political processes and to elect candidates of their choice.” S. REP. NO. 97-417,
at 27–29 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206–07.
73. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
74. Id. at 50.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 51.
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majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to . . . defeat the minority’s
preferred candidate.”77
The Section 2 amendments lowered the burden of proof for
plaintiffs and subsequently became the “ideal tool” to tackle vote
dilution schemes and “increas[e] minority representation.”78 In the two
decades following the amendments, “the vast majority of Section 2
litigation occurred in the vote dilution context.”79 Litigants’ increased
use of Section 2 can be explained by the difficulty of proving
discriminatory intent.80 But given Section 2’s substantial focus on vote
dilution, challengers can no longer effectively turn to this provision for
new vote restricting legislation.
C. Section 4, Section 5, and Shelby
Voting discrimination at the time of the VRA’s passage involved
vote denial and disenfranchisement schemes. But as courts enjoined
one discriminatory practice, jurisdictions simply employed a different
exclusionary tactic.81 Section 5’s preclearance requirement eliminated
the frequent burden of bringing another lawsuit every time
jurisdictions implemented a new scheme. Instead, it mandated that
certain jurisdictions demonstrate nondiscrimination before passing a
new voting law.82 More specifically, Section 5 required states and
localities that met the criteria listed in Section 4(b) to obtain approval
from the Attorney General or a three-judge panel of the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia prior to
“enact[ing] . . . any . . . standard, practice, or procedure with respect to
voting.”83 Section 4(a) allowed a jurisdiction covered by Section 4(b)
to be released from coverage if it could prove both that the change in
voting policy was not made with discriminatory intent and that it would
not have a racially discriminatory effect.84 Section 5 “essentially froze
the voting status quo in place” until covered jurisdictions could

77. Id.
78. Lang & Hebert, supra note 29, at 783.
79. Ho, Building an Umbrella in a Rainstorm, supra note 57, at 801.
80. See Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 44 (“The intent test . . . places an ‘inordinately difficult’
burden of proof on plaintiffs . . . .” (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 36)).
81. Tokaji, If It’s Broke, Fix It, supra note 46, at 791.
82. Id.
83. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 437–38 (codified as
amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (2018)).
84. Id. § 4(a) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10303(a)).
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demonstrate nondiscrimination.85 Though Section 5 prevented the
implementation of discriminatory voting laws in several jurisdictions
with persistent discrimination,86 many others were not yet covered by
Section 4(b)’s criteria. In those uncovered jurisdictions, restrictive
voting laws have “exploded in recent years.”87
Despite the rising number of restrictive voting laws and votingrelated controversies,88 in 2013, the Court in Shelby County v. Holder
struck down Section 4(b) of the VRA, thereby eliminating the Section
5 preclearance regime.89 The Court stated that the VRA “punish[ed]
for the past” and failed to appropriately develop a framework to
identify jurisdictions based on their current conditions.90 Further, the
Court held that Section 4(b) applied too broadly and did not
sufficiently target the problem it sought to address.91
Justice Ginsburg forewarned that “[t]hrowing out preclearance
when it has worked and is continuing to work to stop discriminatory
changes is like throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because
you are not getting wet.”92 Section 5 helped curtail discriminatory
voting laws in “parts of the country where voting discrimination had
proved stubbornly persistent,”93 but its dismantling in Shelby opened
the floodgates of discrimination. In the weeks following the Court’s
decision in Shelby, states formerly subject to Section 5 preclearance
“capitalize[d] on their new found freedom.”94 In 2013, nine previously
covered states enacted new vote denial schemes to restrict voter
access.95 Leading up to the 2014 midterms, fifteen states passed new
voting restrictions.96 John Lewis, who led the march from Selma, called

85. Ho, Voting Rights Litigation After Shelby County, supra note 26, at 676.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.; see also BRENNAN CTR., Election 2016, supra note 40 (“Starting after the 2010
election, legislators in nearly half the states passed a wave of laws making it harder to vote. These
new restrictions ranged from cuts to early voting to burdens on voter registration to strict voter
ID requirements.”).
89. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013).
90. Id. at 553.
91. Id. at 554.
92. Id. at 590 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
93. Ho, Voting Rights Litigation After Shelby County, supra note 26, at 676.
94. Brian F. Jordan, Finding Life in Hurricane Shelby: Reviving the Voting Rights Act by
Reforming Section 3 Preclearance, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 969, 989 (2014).
95. Ho, Voting Rights Litigation After Shelby County, supra note 26, at 676–77.
96. Ho, Building an Umbrella in a Rainstorm, supra note 57, at 800.

AZIZ IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

DOG WHISTLES

11/18/2019 10:00 AM

681

the Shelby decision “a dagger in the heart of the Voting Rights Act of
1965.”97
D. Section 3
To continue protecting voting rights after Shelby, litigants turned
to Section 3 of the VRA. Section 3 allows a judge to require a
jurisdiction to obtain preapproval for any “voting qualification or
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect
to voting” prior to enactment upon a finding that the jurisdiction
violated the Fourteenth Amendment.98 Accordingly, voting rights
litigators have increasingly added Fourteenth Amendment intentional
discrimination claims to their challenges.99
Though Section 3’s preclearance resembles the Section 5
preclearance requirement eliminated in Shelby, the Court left Section
3 intact.100 This is likely because Section 3 is more targeted than Section
5.101 Specifically, Section 3 directly addresses the Shelby Court’s
concern that Section 4 was “based on decades-old data and eradicated
practices”102 by allowing preclearance only for current constitutional
violations.103 Section 3 also allows for a court to impose the
preclearance requirement for a predetermined amount of time and to
tailor that requirement to the violation, allowing for a more flexible
application of the VRA.104
In sum, given the recent shift in voting discrimination from vote
dilution to vote denial,105 Section 2 may no longer be effective in
combatting the new techniques of vote restriction. Section 2
jurisprudence was largely developed and amended as a direct response
to vote dilution laws. Further, because Section 5 preclearance no
longer protects litigants, those plaintiffs are turning to Section 3’s

97. Jeff Zeleny, John Lewis: Court’s Decision Puts ‘Dagger in Heart of Voting Rights Act,’
ABC NEWS (June 26, 2013), https://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/06/courts-decision-putsdagger-in-heart-of-voting-rights-act [https://perma.cc/2G4D-TTS6].
98. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 3, 79 Stat. 437, 437–38 (codified as
amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10302(c) (2018)).
99. Lang & Hebert, supra note 29, at 783.
100. See generally Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (making no mention of Section
3).
101. Wiley, supra note 38, at 2132.
102. Shelby, 570 U.S. at 551.
103. Olds, supra note 24, at 2194–95.
104. Id.
105. Ho, Voting Rights Litigation After Shelby County, supra note 26, at 679.
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comparable preclearance regime.106 Though Section 3 serves as a useful
tool under the VRA to combat vote denial schemes, it requires a
showing of discriminatory intent under the Fourteenth Amendment, a
difficult burden for litigants. Without the ability to prove
discriminatory intent, Section 3 is largely ineffective, and plaintiffs will
be unsuccessful in eliminating discriminatory voting laws.
II. DISCRIMINATORY INTENT
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, ratified in 1868,
guarantees “the equal protection of the laws” to all citizens.107
Presented in the wake of the denial of rights to newly freed slaves, the
Fourteenth Amendment aimed to protect the legal rights granted by
the Thirteenth Amendment.108 It has now become the “single most
important concept in the Constitution for the protection of individual
rights.”109
The Equal Protection Clause “generated a jurisprudence of
intent” after its ratification.110 In order for a court to apply strict
scrutiny,111 current Equal Protection doctrine requires that “the law
classifies on its face on the basis of race” or “it can be shown that a
facially neutral law has an impact and a purpose that discriminate on
such basis.”112 Though discriminatory intent is central to the judicial

106. Lang & Hebert, supra note 29, at 789.
107. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (referred to as the “Equal Protection Clause”).
108. See Mark A. Graber, Subtraction by Addition?: The Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1501, 1510–11 (2012) (“Justice Miller’s opinion in the
Slaughter-House Cases is the canonical statement of the conventional understanding that the
Fourteenth Amendment augmented the constitutional ban on slavery.”).
109. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 14.1, at 383 (8th ed. 2010).
110. Aziz Z. Huq, What is Discriminatory Intent?, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1211, 1225 (2018).
111. If plaintiffs cannot prove that a government action or statute was motivated by
discriminatory intent, the Court applies a deferential standard of review and “will uphold the
action if it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest.” Julia Kobick, Discriminatory
Intent Reconsidered: Folk Concepts of Intentionality and Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 45
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 517, 521–22 (2010). On the other hand, if plaintiffs “can prove that the
government intended to discriminate on the basis of race . . . , the Court will apply a strict scrutiny
analysis, upholding the government action only if it is necessary to achieve a compelling
government objective and is narrowly tailored to achieve that objective.” Id. at 522; see also
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (applying that standard); Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (same); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)
(same).
112. Sofia D. Martos, Coded Codes: Discriminatory Intent, Modern Political Mobilization, and
Local Immigration Ordinances, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2099, 2114 (2010); see also ERWIN
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interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause today, the requirement
of proving intent was not obvious from the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment.113 This Part will discuss three instrumental cases in the
creation of the discriminatory-intent framework: Washington v.
Davis,114 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp.,115 and Personnel Administrator v. Feeney.116
In Davis, the Court held that a showing of discriminatory impact
alone was insufficient to establish a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.117 Specifically, the Court explained that a law is not
automatically invalid under the Equal Protection Clause “simply
because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another”
if it is neutral on its face and serves a valid government purpose.118 To
trigger strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, the plaintiff
was required to demonstrate that the intent of the law was to
discriminate on the basis of race.119
However, the Court clarified that disproportionate impact is not
irrelevant, and that a finding “that the law bears more heavily on one
race than another” can support an inference that the law had an
invidious discriminatory purpose.120 Further, the Court made clear that
discrimination need not appear on the face of the statute.121 To infer
discriminatory intent, courts can consider a “totality of the relevant
facts,” including the existence of a discriminatory impact.122 Despite
establishing this test, the Court did not elucidate clear factors for
litigants to use in proving discriminatory intent.123

CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 687–89 (4th ed. 2011)
(observing the differing levels of scrutiny applicable to different types of discrimination).
113. Huq, supra note 110, at 1212–13.
114. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
115. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
116. Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
117. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 241–42.
120. Id. at 242.
121. Id. at 241.
122. Id. at 242.
123. See id. (concluding that “an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from
the totality of the relevant facts,” including discriminatory impact, but not providing further facts
to assist in the inquiry).
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One year later, in Arlington Heights, the Court provided six
nonexclusive124 factors to evaluate evidence of discriminatory intent:
(1) the discriminatory effect of the official action; (2) the “historical
background of the decision”; (3) the “specific sequence of events
leading up to the challenged decision”; (4) “[d]epartures from the
normal procedural sequence”; (5) departures from normal substantive
standards; and (6) the “legislative or administrative history” of the
decision.125 The Court’s articulation of these six factors created a more
precise and objective test than the one created in Davis.126 Although
the Court noted that the factors could support a finding of
discriminatory intent, it also left room for further development by
emphasizing that the factors were not exhaustive.127
In Feeney, the Court further defined discriminatory purpose. The
Court held that even if a disparate impact was foreseeable, the
constitutional standard for discriminatory intent requires proof that
decision-makers acted because of this impact, not merely in spite of
it.128 In other words, the Court found that generalized intent was
insufficient to prove discriminatory purpose and that the Fourteenth
Amendment required a stronger showing of specific intent.129 Though
the Court reaffirmed the practicality of using the objective factors from
Arlington Heights in proving discriminatory intent,130 it ultimately
developed a more subjective inquiry into the specific intent of the
legislature.131 Feeney’s subjective inquiry imposes a significantly more
demanding burden of proof on litigants bringing challenges under the
Fourteenth Amendment.132
124. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 (1977) (“The
foregoing summary identifies, without purporting to be exhaustive, subjects of proper inquiry in
determining whether racially discriminatory intent existed.”).
125. Id. at 266–68.
126. Kobick, supra note 111, at 525. Compare Davis, 426 U.S. at 242 (establishing the “totality
of the relevant facts” test and suggesting consideration of discriminatory impact), with Vill. of
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266–68 (providing at least six specific factors to guide
discriminatory-intent analysis).
127. See Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268 (noting that the factors are not “purporting
to be exhaustive”).
128. Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (“[Discriminatory purpose] implies that
the decisionmaker, in this case a state legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course of
action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group.”).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 279 n.24.
131. Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1065, 1082–85 (1998).
132. Id. at 1082.
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III. DISCRIMINATORY INTENT IN VOTING RIGHTS LITIGATION
Expressions of discrimination have become more subtle in recent
years,133 and dog whistles have largely taken the place of explicit
discriminatory statements in campaign communications.134 As voters
respond favorably to these dog whistles, politicians continue to use
these tactics to appeal to their racial resentments and animosities.135 As
a result, even though “smoking gun” evidence of discriminatory intent
has largely been eliminated, the high burden of proving such intent in
a Fourteenth Amendment challenge frustrates claims when plaintiffs
cannot produce conclusive evidence of intentional discrimination.136
Despite acknowledging the obstacles litigants face in proving intent,
courts have generally declined to use campaign rhetoric as evidence of
discriminatory intent in Fourteenth Amendment challenges.137
This Part argues that courts should consider dog whistles in
campaign speech as evidence of discriminatory intent in voting rights
challenges. As a threshold consideration, it discusses discerning the
intent of a legislative body—a daunting but achievable task in most
voting rights challenges. After discussing legislative intent, this Part
examines three reasons why proving discriminatory intent is
particularly important for plaintiffs engaged in voting rights litigation.
First, distinguishing between racial-discrimination motivations and
political-party motivations is uniquely difficult and therefore poses an
additional challenge in proving discriminatory intent in a voting rights
challenge; second, if litigants are able to prove discriminatory intent,
they are afforded additional protection in the form of a preclearance
regime under Section 3 of the VRA; and third, when challengers can
successfully prove intent, broader, less tailored remedies become
available. Allowing the use of dog whistles in campaign statements as
evidence of discriminatory intent gives litigators a necessary tool to
ease the insurmountable burden of proving discriminatory intent in
voting rights challenges.
133. Godsil, supra note 41, at 247–48.
134. See, e.g., Emily Cadei, How Donald Trump Made Race the Wedge Issue of 2016,
NEWSWEEK (Aug. 31, 2016, 11:21 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/trump-race-wedge-issue494601 [https://perma.cc/4MWW-8Q8S] (“Socially, it’s become unacceptable to be openly
racist. . . . Most politicians these days, however, prefer to address the issue through coded
language and references that can trigger subconscious racial biases, popularly referred to as ‘dog
whistle’ politics.”).
135. McElwee & McDaniel, supra note 23.
136. Godsil, supra note 41, at 270.
137. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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A. Legislative Intent
First, as a preliminary matter, it is necessary to discuss the
importance of proving a legislative body’s intent. To succeed on an
Equal Protection challenge, litigants must prove that the body acted
with invidious intent.138 Though proving the intent of a legislature can
be a complex task, scholars have posited several compelling theories to
attribute and discern collective intent. Many arguments rely on the
central premise that a legislative body is a “They, not an It,”139 meaning
the intent of individual legislators or coalitions of legislators can play a
critical role in legislative-intent analysis.140 It is important to remember
that different members of a legislature may support laws for different
reasons, and it would therefore be imprudent to believe that the group
“shares[s] some collective meta-intent.”141 Consequently, when
examining the intent of a legislative body, it is more sensible to focus
on the specific intents of key players, the meaningful compromises
made during the voting process, and consensus through agreement
with a committee chairman.
First, the intent of a legislator who was in “a critical position to
forge a final legislative compromise” and whose vote is critical to the
act’s success is significant in discerning the legislature’s collective
intent.142 In fact, both common sense and the law regularly attribute
intent to collective bodies based on the intentions of key players within

138. See Lang & Hebert, supra note 29, at 784–85 (“In order to prevail on an intentional
discrimination claim, plaintiffs must show that a discriminatory purpose was at least part of the
motivation for the passage of a law. But adjudicating the intent of an entire legislative body can
be a complex task.”).
139. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron,
12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 239–42 (1992). This basic premise is also at the core of the
argument that collections of individuals cannot have intent. Id. Those arguments conclude that
legislative intent is incoherent or undiscoverable to the extent that a collective body cannot be
charged with having an intent. Id.; see Robert C. Farrell, Legislative Purpose and Equal
Protection’s Rationality Review, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1, 11 (1992) (“If legislative purpose is the mere
aggregation of the motivations of individual legislators, then there seems no escaping the
conclusion that the very idea of legislative purpose is incoherent.”).
140. See Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of
Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U.
PA. L. REV. 1417, 1432 (2003) (“The process of legislation, then, is shaped by the decisions made
by legislators to form and maintain coalitions within the institutional structure of the legislature
and within the structure of those nonlegislative institutions . . . .”).
141. Id. at 1433.
142. Id. at 1450.

AZIZ IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

DOG WHISTLES

11/18/2019 10:00 AM

687

a group.143 A similar attribution can be made to the leaders—“pivotal
legislators on whose support the legislation’s future depends.”144
Typically, these leaders are moderates, who, if united as a bloc, could
either defeat or pass legislation.145 Though some argue that each vote
is equally critical to the final legislative outcome, that claim does not
hold up in practice.146 Without the leaders’ assent, the legislation could
not be passed, and therefore, their intentions are central to an act’s
meaning.147
Second, in a similar vein, legislative intent should focus not only
on the intentions of the side that won—or even the strongest initial
supporters of the bill—but also on “the accommodations that were
necessary to gain the support of the moderates.”148 Legislation results
from bargaining and compromises between numerous parties with a
wide range of motivations.149 In the legislative process, two parties with
opposing objectives debate over an issue, and the majority chooses
between the two sides.150 “[C]ourts seeking to interpret the legislation
should look to . . . the side that won, especially its leaders, in order to
guide their interpretation.”151 This is because the legislative process is
a compromise among three groups: “ardent supporters,” “ardent
opponents,” and “moderates.”152 Legislation is ultimately generated
from a compromise between the ardent supporters and the moderates,
meaning these compromises are central to the legislation’s meaning.153
Third, an interpretation in the committee report and by the
committee chairman can be thought of as congressional consensus

143. See generally Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of
Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427 (2005) (defending the use of
legislative intent through examples from linguistics, social and developmental psychology, and
philosophy).
144. Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 140, at 1450–51.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1450.
147. Id.
148. McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation,
80 GEO. L.J. 705, 711–12 (1992) (emphasis omitted).
149. Id. at 711.
150. Id. This description of the legislative process is “idealized” and fails to address situations
where multiple views—as opposed to just two—are expressed for more controversial legislation.
Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 711–12.
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unless expressly denied by a legislator.154 In other words, to insist that
each individual legislator must express his specific reasons for
supporting legislation in addition to voting “aye” disregards the
realities of legislative procedure.155 Instead, a “mere expression of
assent” acts as agreement with the view presented in a report or
meeting.156 Further, a legislator voting down a piece of legislation or
accepting it based on a statement made by its proponent is strong
evidence of intent.157 Therefore, legislative history focused on the
reasons for agreement or disagreement provides an accurate and
compelling guide to legislative intent.158
B. Distinguishing Between Racial-Discrimination Motivations and
Political-Party Motivations
Intentional discrimination claims in voting rights challenges pose
the unique difficulty of distinguishing one’s race from her party
affiliation.159 The increasing polarization along political lines is
matched by a parallel increase in racial polarization,160 resulting in a
“more consistent alignment of race, party, and ideology.”161 Now, the
idea that “it is possible to separate considerations of race from those of
party is ludicrous.”162 For example, in 2008, President Obama “lost the
white vote by 20 percent, but won with a nonwhite margin of 62
percent.”163 Before the 2016 presidential election, a poll indicated that
in North Carolina, 100 percent of African American voters supported
Hillary Clinton, while 67 percent of white voters supported Donald
Trump.164

154. James M. Landis, A Note on “Statutory Interpretation,” 43 HARV. L. REV. 886, 888–90
(1930).
155. Id. at 888.
156. Id. at 888–89.
157. Id. at 889.
158. Id.
159. Bruce E. Cain & Emily R. Zhang, Blurred Lines: Conjoined Polarization and Voting
Rights, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 867, 888 (2016).
160. Id. at 873.
161. Id. at 869.
162. Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party, Race as Party, or Party All the Time: Three Uneasy
Approaches to Conjoined Polarization in Redistricting and Voting Cases, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1837, 1839 (2018).
163. Cain & Zhang, supra note 159, at 873.
164. ELON POLL, NORTH CAROLINA RACES TIGHTEN AS ELECTION DAY APPROACHES 1
(2016), https://www.elon.edu/e/CmsFile/GetFile?FileID=694 [https://perma.cc/7K87-E244].
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With the close alignment of race and political party, a common
defense to voting rights challenges is that the legislators acted for
partisan reasons rather than race-motivated reasons.165 If a court finds
that partisan factors motivate a challenged law rather than race, the
law may be given deference.166 If, on the other hand, a court finds that
racial animus prompted the law, it will not be given deference and the
litigants would likely win.167 The Supreme Court has held that, in a
racial gerrymandering case in which race and party closely correlate,
the plaintiffs must be able to show that the legislature drew the
boundaries “because of race rather than because of political
behavior.”168 This dramatic difference in outcomes based on a
reframing of the law can lead to manipulation by legislators, especially
in light of the interconnectedness between race and politics. For
example, a legislator could use partisan data to achieve racial
discrimination and distort election results,169 but she might avoid an
Equal Protection violation by citing partisan motivations.
This tactic is utilized in both vote dilution and vote denial schemes.
In vote dilution schemes—including gerrymandering—legislators can
create racially discriminatory redistricting schemes so long as the
record only suggests political motivations.170 A racially motivated
gerrymander is permissible if, instead of diluting the strength of racial
minorities, the legislator claims that it dilutes the strength of minority
political parties.171 With no evidence on the record of racial motivation,
the litigant will not have sufficient evidence to prove an Equal
Protection violation. Similarly, in vote denial schemes—such as voter
ID or citizenship requirements—legislators can easily claim that the
requirements are measures to prevent voter fraud, thus avoiding a
racial-discrimination challenge.172 Therefore, in a case in which a

165. See, e.g., Lang & Hebert, supra note 29, at 788.
166. Atiba R. Ellis, When Political Domination Becomes Racial Discrimination: NAACP v.
McCrory and the Inextricable Problem of Race in Politics, 68 S.C. L. REV. 517, 531 (2017).
167. Id.
168. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 257 (2001).
169. See Cain & Zhang, supra note 159, at 887–88 (“Conjoined polarization allowed
Republicans in Alabama and Virginia to redistrict based on race and achieve a partisan
outcome.”).
170. Megan Creek Frient, Note, Similar Harm Means Similar Claims: Doing Away with Davis
v. Bandemer’s Discriminatory Effect Requirement in Political Gerrymandering Cases, 48 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 617, 657 (1998).
171. Richard E. Levy, The Nonpartisanship Principle, 25 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 377, 388–89
(2016).
172. Id. at 395–97.
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litigant has evidence of discriminatory intent through dog whistles
made during a campaign, courts should consider the statements in a
discriminatory-intent analysis to protect litigants from discriminatory
voting laws.
C. Section 3 Preclearance
To continue protecting voting rights after Shelby, which
eliminated Section 5’s preclearance regime, litigators have turned to
Section 3 of the VRA. Once a court decides to submit a jurisdiction to
preclearance under Section 3, it can determine the requirement’s
duration and scope.173 If the court later deems that preclearance is no
longer appropriate, it can lift the requirement before the ordered
date.174 Section 3 can also be tailored to address the specific part of the
law that violates the Constitution and leave other procedures
unaffected.175 Section 3’s targeted, tailored, and flexible nature
distinguishes it from Section 5 and, therefore, likely will not get
similarly eliminated.
Because Section 3 preclearance depends on a finding of a
Fourteenth Amendment violation, proving intentional discrimination
has significant benefits for litigants in voting rights challenges. Once a
jurisdiction is submitted to preclearance, plaintiffs can avoid the
burden of relitigating future restrictions. As the Court noted in South
Carolina v. Katzenbach,176 “case-by-case litigation [is] inadequate to
combat widespread and persistent discrimination in voting.”177 Efforts
are especially futile when, even after a litigant wins a suit against a
jurisdiction, the state simply enacts new restrictions designed to
entrench the disparities in voter registration.178 Challenging each new
restriction is “onerous” and “exceedingly slow,” forcing injured
minorities to live under discriminatory laws while awaiting the results
173. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 3, 79 Stat. 437, 437–38 (codified as
amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10302(c) (2018)).
174. Olds, supra note 24, at 2195.
175. Id.
176. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), abrogated by Shelby Cty. v. Holder,
570 U.S. 529, 551 (2013). Katzenbach discusses the need for Section 5 preclearance, which was
eliminated in Shelby. However, the reasons offered by the Katzenbach Court apply to the idea of
preclearance generally, which was not wholly eradicated by Shelby. Therefore, the arguments
made for Section 5’s preclearance regime can be applied to Section 3 preclearance. See id.
(discussing preclearance generally); Olds, supra note 24, at 2208–13 (arguing that “the Supreme
Court’s logic for upholding preclearance” in Katzenbach should apply to Section 3 preclearance).
177. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 328.
178. Id. at 314.
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of the litigation.179 The “inordinate amount of time and energy
required”180 to challenge restrictive voting laws highlights the need for
a robust, more enduring remedy under Section 3. To ease the heavy
burdens associated with proving discriminatory intent, courts should
allow litigants the use of dog whistles made during campaigns as
evidence. This will provide litigants the availability of Section 3
preclearance and “shift the advantage of time and inertia from the
perpetrators of the evil to its victims.”181
D. Broader, Less Tailored Remedies
Even if a court determines preclearance to be inappropriate, the
remedies available to challengers who can prove discriminatory intent
differ significantly from remedies available in impact-only violations.182
When a violation is found based on proof of discriminatory impact but
not discriminatory intent, the court must tailor the remedy to
“maintain legitimate legislative priorities where possible.”183 Though
the court should fashion the remedy to cure the impact-only violation
and provide minorities equality at the ballot box, the “remedy must be
narrowly tailored to include only those measures necessary to cure the
defect.”184
On the other hand, when a court finds discriminatory intent, it is
no longer required to tailor the remedy narrowly.185 In cases involving
discriminatory intent, courts instead have a duty to eliminate the
discrimination “root and branch”186 and ensure that the remedy
“restore[s] the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they
would have occupied in the absence of such conduct.”187 Courts can
invalidate laws enacted with discriminatory purpose in their entirety
rather than having to establish narrow—and potentially harmful—

179. Id.
180. Id. at 328.
181. Id.
182. Lang & Hebert, supra note 29, at 790.
183. Id.; see also Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 280 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Such scrutiny should
be seen not as heavy-handed judicial rejection of legislative priorities, but as part of a process of
harmonizing those priorities with the fundamental right to vote . . . .”).
184. Dillard v. Baldwin Cty. Bd. of Educ., 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1469 (M.D. Ala. 1988).
185. Lang & Hebert, supra note 29, at 790.
186. Id.
187. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977) (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,
746 (1974)).
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alternatives.188 After invalidating a law in its entirety, a court can
require that the jurisdiction return to its prior, nondiscriminatory
voting procedures.189
The significant distinctions in the remedies available to litigants
who can prove discriminatory intent further demonstrate the
importance of easing the burden of proving discriminatory intent in
voting rights challenges. Allowing litigants to prove discriminatory
intent through dog whistles made during campaigns would open the
possibility of more robust and overarching remedies. These remedies
are necessary to eradicate discriminatory vote denial schemes and
ensure that minorities have equal access to the ballot box.
IV. DENYING DISCRIMINATORY CAMPAIGN STATEMENTS
Subtle forms of racial bias continue to exist in the campaign
context, and dog whistles have become increasingly prevalent in recent
years.190 However, Feeney’s subjective inquiry into the specific intent
of the legislature imposes a significantly more demanding burden of
proof on litigants bringing challenges under the Fourteenth
Amendment.191 After Feeney, courts have limited evidence of
discriminatory intent to official governmental records and have largely
“refused to consider ‘unofficial’ or ‘extra-official’ evidence of
animus.”192 This refusal “betrays both the letter and the spirit of the
Arlington Heights six-factor test,” which allows for a “broad inquiry”
into “extra-governmental context.”193 In fact, factors two and three
specifically permitted evaluation of the “historical background of the
decision” and the “specific sequence of events leading up to the
challenged decision.”194
Even though no doctrinal restriction prevents courts from
considering such evidence, both judges and scholars have argued that
“campaign statements should be inadmissible per se in the

188. See Lang & Hebert, supra note 29, at 790–91 (discussing the differences between a
results-only remedy and a remedy when intentional discrimination was found in Texas and North
Carolina cases).
189. Id. at 791.
190. See supra notes 5, 16–23, 133–35 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of
dog whistles in campaign rhetoric and their appeal to voters).
191. Foster, supra note 131, at 1082–85.
192. Fields, supra note 42, at 283–84.
193. Id. at 285.
194. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68 (1977).
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discriminatory-intent analysis.”195 This Part will address several
arguments against consideration of campaign statements, including
dog whistles, in proving discriminatory intent such as the unreliability
of campaign statements, their chilling effects on campaign speech, and
the fact that they are not official communications. It ultimately
concludes, however, that these arguments are often overstated and do
not support a bright-line rule excluding dog whistles as evidence of
discriminatory intent.
A. Unreliability
This Section argues that critics of using campaign statements as
evidence of discriminatory intent often exaggerate the unreliability of
campaign statements in demonstrating motive. It suggests that instead
of a categorical exclusion on campaign statements, courts should allow
the use of campaign statements—and dog whistles during campaigns—
as evidence of discriminatory intent and assess their evidentiary weight
as they do for all other pieces of evidence.196
First, critics misrepresent that campaign statements are unreliable
to prove discriminatory intent because these statements “lack a
sufficient temporal connection to the legal actions” challenged.197 They
argue that, because candidates begin campaigning long before actually
assuming office, there may be a significant lapse of time between policy
statements and implementation of policy.198 During this time,
“intervening events might alter a candidate’s mental state,” and
thereby, her intentions.199 Therefore, when politicians make
discriminatory statements in campaigns long before they vote on
legislation, it may not be certain that they still hold the same beliefs
and motivations expressed earlier.200
This argument ignores the fact that though some campaign
statements are made years before policy implementation, others are
made simultaneously with government action.201 Further, even some
statements outside the campaign context can be made long before the
195. Fields, supra note 42, at 294.
196. Id.; see Michael Coenen, Campaign Communications and the Problem of Government
Motive, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 333, 360 (2018).
197. Coenen, supra note 196, at 360 (emphasis omitted).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See id. (giving an example of a candidate running for reelection while still conducting
government business and implementing policy).
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relevant policy comes into effect.202 Thus, the connection between a
campaign statement and the implementation of a specific policy is not
necessarily eliminated because of the time elapsed between the two
events. Accordingly, courts should consider the time between the
campaign statement and the implementation of the challenged policy
when evaluating the statement’s evidentiary weight rather than its
admissibility.203
Second, critics argue that campaign speech is unreliable due to the
inherently self-interested and competitive nature of elections, ignoring
the fact that elected officials continue making self-interested
statements even after elections end.204 These critics argue that to get
elected, politicians lie and “make explicitly biased remarks to pander
to the base emotions of voters.”205 As a result, campaign statements do
not reveal the politician’s true discriminatory intentions.206 Judge Alex
Kozinski argued that campaign promises can only demonstrate the
politician’s intent to win the election and nothing more when he stated,
“No shortage of dark purpose can be found by sifting through the daily
promises of a drowning candidate, when in truth the poor shlub’s only
intention is to get elected.”207 The detractors argue that these biased
campaign statements are “often insincere, designed to appeal to
voters.”208 This argument envisions the “stereotypical political
candidate . . . who will say anything to get elected, even if that means
saying one thing at 10:00 a.m., another thing at noon, and a third thing
at 6:00 p.m.”209
These arguments about lies and pandering in campaign statements
ignore the fact that officials who are already in office also routinely
pander “to get re-elected, acquire influence within the party, and curry
favor with their constituents.”210 Despite this fact, courts are willing to
202. Id. at 360–61 (giving an example of an “inauguration speech about legislation that takes
several years to pass”).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 361; Fields, supra note 42, at 299–300.
205. Clarke, supra note 42, at 553.
206. Id.
207. Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2017) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
208. Fields, supra note 42, at 300 (quoting Eugene Kontorovich, Opinion, The 9th Circuit’s
Dangerous and Unprecedented Use of Campaign Statements to Block Presidential Policy, WASH.
POST (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/02/09/
the-9th-circuits-dangerous-and-unprecedented-use-of-campaign-statements-to-blockpresidential-policy [https://perma.cc/R24T-4HCG]).
209. Id.
210. Coenen, supra note 196, at 361.
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separate sincerity from exaggerated pandering when analyzing
statements made by elected officials.211 Courts are equipped to give
different pieces of evidence the appropriate weight and routinely assess
their value in the record.212 Therefore, courts should do the same for
dog whistles in campaign statements rather than drawing a bright-line
rule excluding the statements altogether.
Further, campaign statements likely shape politicians’ motives
after they get elected.213 When candidates make promises during a
campaign, they feel obligated to deliver on those promises when they
are elected.214 Even if the candidate lacked a personal intention to
discriminate in campaign speeches, once the statements were made,
they “created a reality in which the candidate needed to follow through
on [them].”215 Similarly, even if the politician’s motives did not change
and he enacted discriminatory policies solely to please his constituents,
the policies themselves would be no less discriminatory.216 In essence,
the discriminatory views of the constituents can be attributed to the
politician “as a conduit.”217 Therefore, despite concerns about the
reliability of campaign statements, the statements may in fact represent
genuine indications of discriminatory intent and should be given weight
as evidence of discriminatory intent.
B. Chilling Effect
This Section argues that critics overstress the chilling effects of
using campaign speech as evidence of intent. Ultimately, these
arguments for a per se ban of campaign statements are unconvincing
in their application because their future use in litigation does not have
a general chilling effect and may actually create beneficial selfcensorship.
Critics argue that if candidates’ campaign statements will be used
against politicians in constitutional challenges, it will have a chilling
effect on campaign communications generally. Rather than openly
express their motives, politicians will pretend to support policies for
reasons that they do not believe or “not say[] anything about those

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id.
Fields, supra note 42, at 301.
Coenen, supra note 196, at 362.
Id.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Clarke, supra note 42, at 554.
Id.
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policies at all.”218 As stated by Judge Paul Niemeyer, “[i]t is hard to
imagine a greater or more direct chill on campaign speech than the
knowledge that any statement made may be used later” to prove
discriminatory intent in a legal challenge.219 This chilling effect, critics
lament, results in the lack of political dialogue, which in turn deprives
voters of information when voting.220 Critics continue this argument by
citing to First Amendment free speech principles;221 they make the
consequentialist argument that any chilling effect on political
campaigns is a cost on free speech values and thus a reason for a
categorical ban on campaign speech as evidence.222
Though these arguments seem persuasive at first blush, they are
ultimately overstated. A candidate hoping to win an election is not
focused on the possibility of future litigation.223 In fact, if a politician
sees present value in making a statement, she will “opt for the
immediate electoral gain” and worry about future consequences only
when they arise.224 This is especially true concerning candidates for the
legislature, who often do not believe their statements will be
attributable to the institution’s reasons for acting.225 Additionally, most
officials are “already circumspect, avoiding gaffes for reasons related
to the desire to be reelected rather than in anticipation of lawsuits.”226
For these politicians, the purported chilling effects would not disappear
the moment the campaign ends, but instead would seem to last
throughout their political careers.227 This demonstrates the
inconsistency of ignoring campaign statements but allowing statements
from outside of the campaign context. Therefore, utilizing dog

218. Coenen, supra note 196, at 366.
219. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 651 (4th Cir. 2017) (Niemeyer,
J., dissenting).
220. Coenen, supra note 196, at 366.
221. Professor Coenen clarifies that First Amendment concerns do not “suggest that
campaign-cognizant motives review might violate the First Amendment itself.” Id. at 367 n.97
(emphasis omitted). Violation is unlikely, “given the absence of any sort of ‘official sanction’ or
‘punishment’” when considering campaign statements. Id. However, the First Amendment
concerns are applicable to the extent that free speech values “might militate against judicial
reliance” on the use of campaign statements in proving intent. Id.
222. Id. at 367–68.
223. Id. at 366–67.
224. Id. at 367.
225. Id.
226. Clarke, supra note 42, at 576.
227. Id. at 553.
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whislteds in campaign statements as evidence of discriminatory intent
will not alter politicians’ behaviors in any realistic way.
Although employing campaign speech as evidence of
discriminatory intent will not have a generalized chilling effect on all
campaign communications, it may lead to positive self-censorship by
politicians. When individual politicians refrain from engaging in
discriminatory speech, it is “a welcome[d] restraint.”228 Ultimately, by
refusing to use campaign statements in discriminatory-intent analysis,
courts are giving politicians license to make discriminatory statements
without consequence.229 Politicians will likely feel more empowered to
use dog whistles during their campaigns, as they are subtle enough to
be understood by a particular group without attracting public scrutiny.
C. Official Communications
Finally, this Section argues that critics of utilizing campaign
statements as evidence of discriminatory intent assert that the
Constitution does not govern what private persons do in their
unofficial capacities. It concludes that a bright-line rule excluding
unofficial campaign statements, including dog whistles, misinterprets
the purpose of the discriminatory-intent analysis and should be
discredited.
Critics misguidedly argue that because campaign statements are
made in politicians’ unofficial capacities before they have an obligation
to uphold the Constitution, the statements cannot reveal “the
government’s ostensible object.”230 In advancing this argument, critics
argue that campaign statements are irrelevant because only an official
objective can violate the Constitution231 and that private statements
cannot be attributed to the official conduct of government actors.232
Further, they contend that the Constitution is concerned with state
action and does not regulate the unofficial conduct of private
persons.233 This argument needlessly distinguishes between official and

228. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 600 (4th Cir. 2017).
229. Fields, supra note 42, at 314.
230. McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005).
231. See, e.g., Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 9, Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project,
138 S. Ct. 353 (2017) (No. 16-1436), 2017 WL 2610075, at *9; Clarke, supra note 42, at 551.
232. Fields, supra note 42, at 310.
233. Coenen, supra note 196, at 364.
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unofficial conduct, drawing a bright-line exclusion against analyzing
unofficial conduct in determining an action’s constitutionality.234
Though the Fourteenth Amendment only governs state action—
and a private citizen’s actions cannot violate the Fourteenth
Amendment—courts have the authority to consider unofficial
statements when evaluating whether postelection actions were
motivated by discriminatory intent. The central focus of
discriminatory-intent analysis is to consider whether a government
official had an improper and unconstitutional motive in taking official
action.235 To this end, “an official’s statements are all the more
important” in determining whether an official action was motivated by
discriminatory purpose.236 In fact, a politician acting in his unofficial
capacity can “propose, describe, explain, and/or justify” actions he
plans to take in his official capacity.237 Once the politician is elected,
those earlier statements are relevant in determining the
constitutionality of subsequent official actions.238 A categorical bar on
dog whistles made during a campaign in a discriminatory-intent
analysis conflates “what the Constitution prohibits with . . . how
prohibited conduct may be shown”239 and ignores the purpose of
discriminatory-intent analysis.
CONCLUSION
Both dog whistles in campaign speech and discriminatory voting
laws have increased in recent years. Nevertheless, voters have faced
challenges proving discriminatory intent, a barrier they must surpass in
an Equal Protection challenge under Section 3 of the VRA. Courts
have supported a per se ban on campaign statements as evidence of
discriminatory intent, blocking litigants’ ability to demonstrate a
legislator’s intent through dog whistles made during a campaign.
The right to vote is considered as central and fundamental as the
right to bodily integrity and is critical to a legitimate democracy. When

234. See id. (“The argument would thus posit a key distinction between official and unofficial
conduct, and it would derive from that distinction the rule that only ‘officially’ proclaimed motives
should bear on a law’s constitutionality.”).
235. Fields, supra note 42, at 311.
236. Clarke, supra note 42, at 553.
237. Coenen, supra note 196, at 365.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 364.
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it is violated, “[o]ther rights, even the most basic, are illusory.”240
Allowing the use of dog whistles to prove discriminatory intent in
voting rights challenges ensures that litigants have the necessary tools
to surpass the heavy burden of demonstrating discriminatory intent
and ultimately protects the fundamental right to vote.

240. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560 (1964) (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17
(1964)).

